Efforts that Iran-backed Iraqi militias describe as humanitarian campaigns increasingly show signs of serving as a parallel financial pipeline that also fuels Iran’s current war effort and its regional proxy network. Across Iraq, groups aligned with Tehran are mobilizing these donation drives, framing them as a religious obligation and in wartime solidarity. While the campaigns have showcased footage of providing food assistance and other humanitarian aid, most of these initiatives evade regulated financial controls and include explicitly militaristic messaging, such as aiming to “turn money into a striking force.”
At the center of these efforts are powerful Iranian-backed militias embedded within Iraq’s security and political landscape. They include, but are not limited to:
- Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH), a US-designated terrorist organization led by Qays al Khazali and a key component of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), operates as both a paramilitary group and a political actor with parliamentary representation. The US designated AAH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2020.
- Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN), led by Akram al Kaabi, is another terrorist faction integrated into Iran’s regional proxy network, with a history of deployments in Syria and coordination with Lebanese Hezbollah. The group was designated as an FTO in 2025.
- Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya (HAAA), led by Haydar Muzhir Malak al Saidi, was designated in September 2025 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a banner under which Iran-backed militias claim attacks against US interests and other targets in the country.
Below is a detailed account of select donation campaigns run by US-designated terrorist organizations in Iraq, as well as broader Iraqi fundraising efforts directed toward Iran and Lebanon.
Asaib Ahl al Haq
Asaib Ahl al Haq launched a campaign titled “Faithful to the Promise” that is structured entirely around cash collection. Donors are explicitly prohibited from providing in-kind assistance and are instead directed to deliver funds to designated representatives, whose contact information is circulated across 16 Iraqi governorates. This system channels money through informal intermediaries, effectively bypassing banks and licensed money transfer mechanisms. In parallel, the group’s parliamentary bloc has pledged its March salaries to support the “Iranian and Lebanese people and PMF martyrs.”
Reporting about a donation collection site in Maysan governorate illustrates how the campaign operates. In an interview with Al Ahed TV, a channel affiliated with the group, a campaign manager stated, “There is coordination with the Iranian side, and the delivery of aid has been very smooth.” He added, “If we give [Iran] our souls, we are still falling short.”
Additional footage from these collection sites shows the messaging surrounding the campaign. In one video, a promoter holds up a 25,000 Iraqi dinar note, claiming that the funds “will be used as missiles to attack the Zionist entity.” In another clip from a separate site, a speaker similarly declares that donations “will become Iranian missiles to target the Arab Gulf states, including American bases in the Gulf.”
Social media accounts affiliated with Asaib Ahl al Haq also highlight the campaign’s international activities. For example, footage shows AAH volunteers distributing aid to civilians in Isfahan, Iran, as part of a broader initiative “to support the Islamic Republic,” including providing food assistance to local populations.
Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba
Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has rolled out a parallel campaign under the slogan, “From Iraq, we will not abandon Lebanon — one hand resists … and one hand provides relief.” Footage from Lebanon shows aid shipments being unloaded alongside Lebanese Hezbollah flags.
On the ground, Abbas Kanaan, who is associated with the Hezbollah-affiliated Samidoun network and operates within pro-Axis of Resistance circles, appears to be overseeing the Lebanese side of the operation, alongside Alaa Hassan, identified as Nujaba’s representative in Lebanon. A December 2025 Al Arabiya report alleged that Hezbollah officials embezzled funds from the Samidoun program.
Kanaan’s social media activity also reflects repeated expressions of support for Hezbollah, which issued a public appeal to “civil society organizations—especially our brothers in Iraq” to be “a source of support and assistance,” directly linking the effort to the aid pipeline directed toward Iraq. As with Asaib Ahl al Haq, aid appears to flow through intermediaries rather than through formal financial channels.
Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya
Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya has similarly launched a donation drive in support of the Axis of Resistance, the Iran-led network of regional proxies, branding the effort as the “Affection and Loyalty Campaign.” In its promotional materials, the group frames the appeal in explicitly ideological terms, citing what it describes as “the harsh conditions facing our region and Muslim peoples as a result of the brutal ‘Zionist-American’ aggression targeting the heart of the resistance—the Islamic Republic of Iran—and Lebanon, the land of dignity and jihad.”
The statement further invokes the concept of a “unity of fronts,” portraying the conflict as a shared regional battle. It emphasizes that “the battle is our battle” and calls on supporters to participate in what it explicitly labels a “financial front,” urging contributions “in support and solidarity with our brothers in the Islamic Republic and Lebanon (Nasrallah).”
Unlike other purely cash-based collection models, the group also provides structured financial transfer mechanisms. Its campaign materials include instructions for sending funds via electronic payment platforms, specifically Zain Cash and MasterCard, alongside designated account and wallet numbers.
The campaign is reinforced by participation from militia leadership. One post notes that “the deputy commander of the 19th Brigade (HAAA) supported the ‘Affection and Loyalty Campaign,’” adding that “Hajj Abu Hassan al Haliji, alongside the brigade’s fighters, initiated a donation and provided active support to the campaign.” It frames this involvement as “a step reflecting the spirit of solidarity and cohesion.”
Additional support campaigns and sources
Actors that aren’t formally designated as terrorist organizations are operating within this same ecosystem. One example comes from an appeal circulated by Iraqi Member of Parliament Mahdi Taqi, a figure affiliated with the Badr Organization, an Iranian-backed group and member of the PMF that remains undesignated.
Taqi’s announcement urged Iraqis to repay a perceived debt to those who stood by Iraq during the 2014 fight against the Islamic State. The message then transitions to a donation drive, explicitly limited to financial contributions, in support of “the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon, who are fighting in the cause of Allah against the tyrants of this era.” Donors are instructed to deliver cash in person to the MP’s office in Amerli, with multiple phone numbers provided to coordinate contributions. There is no reference to bank accounts. Instead, the system relies on direct, in-person handoffs—localized and entirely outside regulated financial pathways.
Some Lebanon-based accounts receiving funds from Iraqi donation campaigns have claimed that these transfers are being used to support weapons production. A pro-Hezbollah Telegram channel, “South Lebanon, Enemy Spotter,” posted a video showing Iraqis arranging banknotes into the shape of a drone. The accompanying caption stated: “What the #Resistance_Environment in Iraq is doing is not donations—it is direct funding to turn money into a striking force that sends drones over the heads of the ‘illegitimate entity,’ as well as US occupation bases and the normalized Gulf states.”
